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Ethics In Legal Practice In Nebraska:
A Comparative Analysis
By William F. Swindler*:
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest in the improvement of professional practice has been
associated historically with Nebraska at least since Roscoe Pound
shattered the complacency of the American Bar Association with
his renowned address on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice," delivered before the national
convention of the A.B.A. in 1906. The basic problem, as Pound
saw it at that time, was essentially an ethical one; he began his
address by observing:
Justice, which is the end of law, is the ideal compromise be-
tween the activities of each and the activities of all in a crowded
world. The law seeks to harmonize these activities and to adjust
the relations of every man with his fellows so as to accord with the
moral sense of the community. When the community is at one in
its ideas of justice, this is possible. When the community is divided
and diversified, and groups and classes and interests, understanding
each other none to well, have conflicting ideas of justice, the task
is extremely difficult. It is impossible that legal and ethical ideas
should be in entire accord in such a society. The individual looks
at cases one by one and measures them by his individual sense of
right and wrong. The lawyer must look at cases in gross, and must
measure them largely by an artificial standard. He must apply the
ethics of the community, not his own. If discretion is given him,
- his view will be that of the class from which he comes. If his hands
are tied by law, he must apply the ethics of the past as formulated
in common law and legislation. In either event, judicial and indi-
vidual ethical standards will diverge. And this divergence between
the ethical and the legal, as each individual sees it, makes him say
with Luther, "Good jurist, bad Christian."'
When the American Bar Association adopted its Canons of
Professional Ethics in August, 1908, the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation was among the first state groups to adopt them as its
*Professor of Journalism, University of Nebraska. A. B. and B. S., 1935,
Washington University (St. Louis); M.A., 1936; Ph.D., 1942, University of
Missouri; LL.B., 1958, University of Nebraska.
1 Cf. 29 Am. Bar Assn. Report 395, 399 (1906).
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own;2 and in an address on "The Ethical Side of the Case" delivered
at the state convention that year by Charles G. Ryan, a Grand Island
attorney, it was observed that "the maintenance of that code of
ethics must ever remain a matter of individual character, colored
more or less by environs and subject, somewhat, to local interpre-
tations. '3 At the same convention, Dean Pound, in a paper on "The
Etiquette of Justice," expressed the hope that the codes of ethics
then beginning to win general support throughout the country
would become "living bodies of law" and would make it clear that
"there are lawful things which it is not professional to do at all
times," and would reject "every attempt to use adjective law to
defeat justice after the merits have been fairly settled.' 4
Nationally, the concept of an enforceable code was a long time
coming. The famous "Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment," framed by David Hoffman of the Baltimore bar in
1836, and the "Essay on Professional Ethics" composed by Judge
George Sharswood of Philadelphia in 1854, were conspicuous-but
lonely-landmarks of the nineteenth century. State bar associ-
ations themselves did not become general until after the 1870's,
and many of these-including Nebraska's-had only a sporadic
existence until the turn of the century. The first state association
to adopt a code of ethics was Alabama's in 1887. 5 Twenty years
later the A.B.A. addressed itself to the problem and agreed upon
the fundamental need for such a code (1) to promote public con-
fidence in the integrity of the legal system, (2) to impress upon
practitioners the responsibilities devolving upon them as officers
of the courts, and (3) to create an instrument for effective policing
of professional conduct when placed in the hands of the judiciary
and made a condition for admission to practice.6
The first thirty-two Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted
in 1908; thirteen supplemental canons were approved in 1928 at
which time the Nebraska State Bar Association formalhy resolved
2 3 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 12-23 (1909). The Nebraska code of that
date omitted Canon 13 of the A.B.A. code, relating to contingent fees,
and the second paragraph in Canon 15, which held that it was improper
for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client's in-
nocence and the justice of his case. id., 12, 16, 17.
3 Id., 166, 157. Cf. the preamble to the A.B.A. code, which includes the
statement: "No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particular-
ize all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or in
all the relations of professional life." 33 Am. Bar Assn. Report 575 (1908).
4 3 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 231, 251.
5 Cf. 31 Am. Bar Assn. Report 676 (1907).
0 Id. at 676.
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that the amended canons, as well as the complementary Canons on
Judicial Ethics adopted nationally in 1924, should replace those it
had originally adopted in 1909.7 Two other canons were added,
and earlier ones amended, in succeeding years,8 and these were
duly incorporated into the Nebraska code.9
It has often been noted that the A.B.A. canons are essentially
aimed at the conduct of trial lawyers; certainly the first group of
thirty-two concerned themselves almost exclusively with this func-
tion of the attorney, and the subsequent canons have by no means
extended themselves to a comparable degree of definition of office
practice, despite the dominating position assumed by this phase
in the changing professional practices of the past generation. In
any event it may be helpful, in view of the division of the subject
matter in the following parts of this paper, to analyze the current
forty-seven canons by classifying them under eight major subdi-
visions, viz.:10
1. Relations Between Attorney and Court: These embrace the
first five canons, relating to the duty of the lawyer in the courtroom
(1),11 the responsibilities of the bar in the selection of judges (2),
the prohibition of efforts to exploit personal inflluence with a court
(3), the behavior of counsel appointed for indigent prisoners (4),
and the rights and duties of those serving as attorneys for criminal
defendants (5).
2. Relations Between Attorney and Client: These deal with
conflicting interests and the question of their representation by the
same lawyer (6), the policy in receiving parties who have been
clients of another attorney (7), advising clients upon the merits of
their cases (8), the limits of propriety in supporting a client's case
(15), the attorney's responsibility in restraining clients from im-
proper conduct (16) 12 the avoidance of testifying in court as a wit-
ness for one's client (19), and the general matter of treating clients'
confidences (37).
7 20 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 22 (1929).
8 For the table of A.B.A. canons as adopted and amended, see Table I in
the appendix to this paper.
9 Cf. note 28 infra.
10 The text of the canons is not given in this paper, as much for reasons of
space as for the presumption of their familiarity to practitioners. Copies
of the latest revision of the canons of professional and judicial ethics may
be obtained from the American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street,
Chicago 37, Ill.
11 The number refers to the canon on that subject.
12 Cf. also Canon 44.
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3. Relations With Opposing Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel:
These canons define the proper procedure in negotiating with the
adverse party (9), the avoidance of personalities between advocates
(17), and the treatment of witnesses before (39) and during (18)
trial.
4. Conduct During Trial: Attorneys are exhorted to refrain
from discussing pending cases in newspapers (20), to be punctual
and expeditious in court (21), to deal fairly and with candor in all
stages of a case (22), to observe professional courtesies with ref-
erence to the convenience of opposing counsel (24), to avoid various
sycophancies in dealing with juries (23), to refrain from taking
technical advantage of an opponent (25), and to maintain the same
degree of professional integrity in advocacy before bodies other
than courts (26).
5. Fiduciary Principles: The canons impose a particular de-
gree of honor, in inveighing against personal advantage sought by
counsel in the handling of trust property (11) and in the matter
of accepting commissions, rebates and the like without the full
knowledge and consent of the client (38).
6. Fees, Expenses, Etc.: Rules of propriety in the fixing of the
amount of fees (12), the policy to be observed in the matter of con-
tingent fees (13), the necessity of suing a client for professional
remuneration (14), and the question of advancing money to a client
for expenses (42) are canons aimed at- formalizing the attorney's
financial arrangements with those he serves.
7. Partnerships: Relations With Other Practitioners: The
growth of law firms as distinguished from the old-time solo prac-
titioner, particularly in larger communities, led to the 1928 canon
relating to law partnerships (33), and to the question of proper di-
vision of fees (34),13 while the increasing practice of employing
attorneys as house counsel or retaining them for the exclusive
service of trade organizations required special treatment (35). There
was also the question of advertising (27), modified by the permis-
sibility of appearing in certain law lists (43) and giving notice of
particular services offered by a lawyer to local colleagues (46).
The general discouragement of specialized status (45) and the pro-
13 The canon does not mention "fee splitting" by that term, but for a proper
understanding of the modification of this canon under the pressure
against such a practice, cf. the phraseology of the canon as originally
adopted, 53 Am. Bar Assn. Report 496 (1928), the lengthy committee dis-
cussion leading to the amendment of 1933, 58 Am. Bar Assn. Report 161-
166 (1933); and cf. id., 434-435. The' present canon represents the final
amendment of 1937.
LEGAL ETHICS
fession's struggle against unauthorized practice (47) have also
found their place in recent canons.14
8. General Professional Responsibilities: Although all of the
foregoing classifications, and particularly the provisions on fidu-
ciary principles, advertising, and the like, could properly be re-
peated under this heading, the canons which seem particularly to
relate to this general subdivision deal with the prohibition against
acquiring an interest in litigation (10), avoiding the stirring up of
litigation (28), upholding the honor of the profession in general
(29), declining to conduct a cause which seems manifestly intended
to perpetrate a wrong (30), preventing clients from undertaking
improper litigation (31), and avoiding any other acts of disloyalty
to the administration of justice (32). Although a general discussion
of legal principles in the newspapers is permitted, no free advice
on specific issues may be offered (40). Any attempt to impose
upon or deceive a court is to be reported by counsel promptly upon
its discovery (41), and counsel may withdraw from a case only if
he discovers that a client is bent upon an unjust and immoral pur-
pose, or if for any other reason the attorney feels he cannot serve
the interests of his client or the cause of justice by continuing in
the case (44).
To devise such a code was one thing; to enforce it was quite
another. It was originally believed that the courts would adopt
these canons as part of the procedure of admission of attorneys to
their respective bars, but this did not come about at once. The
idea of incorporation of the bar, which came into general discus-
sion about the time of World War I,15 and the movement toward an
integrated bar which took place in the late 1920's and 1930's, were
subsequent propositions for making the codes into an effective reg-
ulatory force. One or more of these means have now come into
rather general use as to the punishment of actual offenses against
professional integrity; 16 but the more important problem of edu-
cating the practitioner against unprofessional behavior in general
-which was the ultimate objective of the codes-obviously re-
quired a different approach. This took the form of the advisory
committee, or committee of inquiry as it was called in Nebraska,
to investigate specific questions of professional conduct and to
14 Cf. Jackson, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 12 Neb. Law Bull. 332
(1934).
15 Cf. 9 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 124 (1916).
16 For the Nebraska procedure on discipline and disbarment, see Part III
of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska, in
force September 1, 1957.
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prepare instructions or advisory opinions upon them. The New
York County Lawyers' Association appears to have organized the
first such committee in 1912, but a similar committee was operating
in Nebraska by 1914.1' The American Bar Association formally
authorized its Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances to
undertake advisory opinions in 1922.18
The work of the Nebraska committee of inquiry was effective,
over the years, not only in settling specific grievances but in calling
attention to the need for a more effective control over the practice
of law in the state. Almost as soon as it began functioning, the com-
mittee called upon the state bar association to support "legislation
that will provide an efficient means for eliminating from the bar of
this state any unworthy members." So long as all attorneys were
not members of the association, and so long as the state supreme
court was largely limited in its disciplinary power to cases against
members brought by the association, the system was manifestly
ineffective. 10 The committee later urged that the attorney general
be required to consider all complaints and to determine whether
disbarment action should be recommended to the supreme court.
20
Detailed procedure for the investigation of such cases was recom-
mended in 1926,21 and the committee was gratified to report favor-
able action by the court two years later.22
Encouraged by these advances, the state association turned its
attention to the bar integration movement,23 and in 1935 a bill was
introduced into the legislature; but it "was immediately met with
vigorous ... opposition by some of our most able lawyers; '24 so the
next year the association proposed that the supreme court under-
take to effect integration by promulgation of appropriate rules,
rather than to wait for a change of legislative opinion.2 5 Following
a poll of Nebraska State Bar Association members, the supreme
court promulgated the rules on September 20, 1937.26 In the process,
17 7 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 46 (1914).
18 47 Am. Bar Assn. Report 286 (1922).
19 Cf. 8 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 82 (1915).
20 14 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 33 (1923).
21 17 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 49, 51-53 (1926).
22 19 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 18 (1928).
2 A detailed history of the background of this movement appears in 25
Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 45-52 (1934).
24 26 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 34 (1935).
25 27 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 55-56 (1936).
26 28 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 323 (1937).
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the court felt compelled to dispose of the question of its authority
to proceed, particularly in view of the prior effort to carry out the
objective through the legislative rather than the judicial branch.
The state constitution, the court conceded, "does not, by any ex-
press grant, vest the power to define and regulate the practice of
law in any of the three departments of government." In the absence
of such specific grant, the court concluded, this power "must be
exercised by the department to which it naturally belongs.."27 The
court then proceeded to cite a number of cases, within its own and
other jurisdictions, illustrating the inherent power of the judiciary
over its own bar, and came to the following conclusion:
An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his
obligations toward it before he ever had a client. His oath requires
him to be absolutely honest even though his client's interests may
seem to require a contrary course. The lawyers cannot serve two
masters; and the one they have undertaken to serve primarily is
the court.
The inherent power of this court which petitioners ask us to
invoke has always existed. This power is not subject to delegation
to committees and representatives, although these agencies may be
utilized for investigation or fact-finding purposes and to make rec-
ommendations, but the final decision must rest with the court.
The primary duty of courts is the proper and efficient adminis-
tration of justice. Attorneys are officers of the court and the author-
ities holding them to be such are legion. They are in effect an
important part of the judicial system of this state. It is their duty
honestly and ably to aid the courts in securing an efficient admin-
istration of justice. The practice of law is so intimately connected
and bound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administra-
tion of justice that the right to define and regulate its practice
naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department of our
state government.28
With the integration of the bar under rules set forth in this
opinion, including the formal adoption of the A.B.A. Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics (Article X) and the provision for the investigation
of complaints (Article XI), the association in 1938 set up a Com-
mittee Advisory to the District Complaint Committees, which was
made a permanent part of the association by the court's amendment
to Article VI (§ 9),29 and which undertook the function of "render-
ing of opinions requested by members of the bar and by district
27 In re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283,
285, 275 N. W. 265, 114 A. L. R. 151 (1937).
28 133 Neb. 283, 289. For sinilar judicial reasoning, cf. Petition of the Flor-
ida State Bar Association, 40 S.2d 902 (1949), citing precedents in Ne-
braska, Missouri and Oklahoma.
29 29 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 244 (1938).
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complaint committees on the propriety of certain practices which
were the subject of inquiry but did not involve formal complaints."3 0
Thus at length came into being the complete system of administra-
tion of professional practice in Nebraska toward which the associ-
ation had been working since its adoption of the first code of ethics
in 1909.
The present paper is a review of the general principles relating
to professional ethics in Nebraska, particularly as reflected in ju-
dicial opinions and in certain statutes. These will be considered,
so far as practicable, under the eight broad headings of classifica-
tion or analysis of the A.B.A. Canons which have been set forth
above. They will also be considered by comparison with advis-
ory opinions of the national association on these same topics,
and with certain advisory opinions published by comparable com-
mittees of other state bar associations.31 From this, it is hoped, a
proper perspective of Nebraska professional practice may be ob-
tained.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
A. STATUTORY BASES
Until 1895, each Nebraska court of record appears to have fol-
lowed the tradition of maintaining its own bar and admitting at-
torneys to practice before it; by a new statute enacted in that year,
however, exclusive power of admission to practice for the state as
a whole was vested in the supreme court.32 This law was one of
several reforms of the legal profession which were introduced in
legislation during the last decade of the nineteenth century and
the first decade of the twentieth. These statutes made more ex-
plicit the nature of and penalties for unauthorized practice of
law,33 admission to the state bar,34 reciprocity in the admission of
30 Id. at 245.
31 In addition to selected advisory opinions from Nebraska and the Amer-
ican Bar Association, published opinions from the following states have
been used in this study: Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
32 Neb. Laws c. 6, § 1 (1895).
33 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-101 (Reissue 1954); for revisions of the statute during
the period of professional reforms, cf. Neb. Laws c. 6, § 1 (1895); Neb.
Laws c. 6, § 1 (1905). And see Neb. Rev. Stat. 7-111 (Reissue 1954).
34 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-102 (Reissue 1954); Neb. Laws c. 6, § 2 (1895); c. 5, § 1(1903); c. 2, § 1 (1907). The state supreme court has been held to have
exclusive power to determine the qualifications of candidates for ad-
mission to the bar. State ex rel. Hunter V. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276
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nonresident attorneys,35 and certain formalities of admission.0 These
revised definitions of practice, it was contended, had the effect of
imposing upon the attorney, upon penalty of revocation of his li-
cense, the standards of honorable behavior exemplified in the
nascent codes of ethics of the period.3 7
Certain of the statutes, although enacted prior to the canons
of the national or state associations, embodied certain principles of
the Hoffman and Sharswood codes by defining the ethical responsi-
bilities of attorneys appointed as counsel for infants38 or for de-
fendants in criminal actions. 39 The general matter of attorney-client
relations, as well as attorney-court relations, covered by several
"canonical" articles, were defined in an early statute on the duties
of attorneys and counselors. 40 So, also, were the general powers of
attorney,41 while the confidential nature of the client's communica-
tions, in terms of inimunity from examination in court, was also
covered by an early law.42
The fiduciary concept in legal practice is reflected in part in
the statute, first enacted in 1911, prohibiting attorneys' fees to es-
tates handled by trust companies,43 as well as in an 1881 law for-
bidding lawyers to act as surety on official bonds.4 4 Embezzlement
by a practitioner, in the nature of the case, called for a particularly
stringent penalty under the criminal statutes.45
N.W. 380 (1937). This may explain why this statute, which provides for
admission without examination in the case of graduates of law schools
which are members of the Association of American Law Schools, is super-
seded by the Rules of the Supreme Court stipulating examination for all
candidates not already admitted in other jurisdictions. Cf. Rules, op. cit.
supra, note 16, II Admission of Attorneys, § 1, 4.
35Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-103 (Reissue 1954); Neb. Laws c. 5, s. 2 (1903); and
cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-109 (Reissue 1954).
36 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue 1954); Neb. Laws c. 5, § 1 (1899).
37 Cf. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Burr, 19 Neb. 593, 28 N.W. 261 (1886);
State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Wiesbusch, 153 Neb. 583, 45 N.W. 2d
583 (1950); State ex rel. Sorensen v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340, 255 N.W. 32
(1934).
38 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-113 (Reissue 1954).
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803, 1804 (Reissue 1956).
4 0 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-105 (Reissue 1954).
41 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-107 (Reissue 1954); cf. also § 7-112.
42 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1206 (Reissue 1956).
43 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 8-206 (Reissue 1954).
44 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 11-114 (Reissue 1954).
45 Cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-538 (Reissue 1956).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
In the definition of attorneys' rights to compensation for pro-
fessional services, the statute provides for a lien upon any papers
of his client which have come into his possession in the course of
his employment, as well as upon any money in his hands belonging
to his client, or in the hands of an adverse party in any proceeding
in which the attorney was employed from the time of giving notice
of the lien to that party.4
6
Perhaps the most pertinent statute of all is that which sub-
jects any lawyer guilty of deceit or collusion with intent to mislead
a court or client to liability of disbarment and of treble damages to
the injured party.47
B. ADJUDICATION
It has always been recognized that a court may prosecute a
party for practicing law without a license,4s " and in Nebraska it
has further been generally held that practicing law without a
license may extend by definition to any type of counseling where
legal knowledge is the basic element of value in the advice given.49
The court reserves the right, as an inherent element of its own
integrity, of prohibiting one of its officers from using any improper
means in the practice of the profession: 50 "The first duty of the
attorney is to the court," it has frequently averred.51 In admitting
one to practice it is intended that he will faithfully discharge this
duty, avoiding any act which would tend to bring reproach upon
the court or the bar.52 The standard of conduct is that expressed
40Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108 (Reissue 1954); and cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1801
(1955 Supp.).
47Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-106 (Reissue 1954).
48State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N.W. 95 (1936); State
ex rel. Wright v. Hinckle, 137 Neb. 735, 291 N.W. 68 (1940).
49 Spier v. Thomas, 131 Neb. 579, 269 N.W. 61 (1936); State ex rel. Hunter
v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937). Perhaps the most extreme
statement of the law on this subject is found in State ex rel. Johnson v.
Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941), wherein the court said: 'We do
not doubt that respondent possesses high qualifications .... But the fact
that he can qualify as an expert in a particular field will not permit his
engaging lawfully in the profession of law without a license to do so."
id. at 95. The defendant was cited for appearing as a rate expert before
the state railway commission.
GO Cf. In re Breckenridge, 31 Neb. 489, 48 N.W. 142 (1891).
51 Nebraska State Bar Association v. Wiebusch, 153 Neb. 583, 45 N.W.2d
583 (1951); and cf. State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Niklaus, 149 Neb.
859, 33 N.W.2d 145 (1948).
52 State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Hungerford, 159 Neb. 468, 67 N.W.2d
759 (1954).
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in the canons of the American Bar Association and such other
canons as the court itself shall from time to time approve. 3
Courts have the inherent duty to impress upon members of
the bar such ethical responsibilities as the keeping of clients' con-
fidences, 54 preserving the respect due to the court by all parties
coming before it,5 5 and generally bringing lawyers to account for
any and all instances of misconduct.50 It has been pointed out on
various occasions that in discharging this duty the courts are es-
sentially discharging a responsibility to the public; and thus a
disbarment proceeding against an attorney is regarded not pri-
marily as punishment but as a protecting of the public interest by
a determination of whether the attorney concerned is qualified to
practice law. 7
Good moral character and circumspect professional conduct
are proper subjects of inquiry for the court, and the lack of such
character or conduct may be ground for suspension or disbarment.r5
"Ambulance chasing," 59 false representations to a surety company,0 0
conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,61
fraudulent conduct in the handling of a decendent's estate, 2 have
all been defined as evidence of bad character or unprofessional prac-
tices. Mere restitution of funds wrongfully taken or withheld will
not exonerate the accused lawyer,63 for the court will not permit
53 State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Palmer, 160 Neb. 786, 71 N.W.2d 491
(1955); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Bates, 162 Neb. 652, 77 N.W.
2d 302 (1956).
54 In re Strelow's Estate, 117 Neb. 168, 220 N.W. 251 (1928).
55 State ex rel. Hunter v. Hatteroth, 134 Neb. 451, 279 N.W. 153 (1938).
56 State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Merten, 142 Neb. 780, 7 N.W.2d 874
(1943).
57 State v. Priest, 123 Neb. 241, 242 N.W. 433 (1932); State ex rel. Hunter v.Crocker, 132 Neb. 214, 271 N.W. 444 (1937); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar
Assn. v. Feehan, 161 Neb. 9, 71 N.W.2d 518 (1955).
58 Bartos v. U. S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Neb., C. C. A. 8th, 19 F.2d 722 (1927);
State v. Fisher, 103 Neb. 736, 174 N.W. 320 (1919); State ex rel. Hunter
v. Marcounnit, 143 Neb. 898, 280 N.W. 216 (1938).
)9 State ex rel. Sorensen v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340, 255 N.W. 32 (1934);
State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Basye, 138 Neb. 806, 295 N.W. 816
(1941).
60 Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Rein, 141 Neb. 758, 4 N.W. 2d 829 (1942).
61 Wright v. Sowards, 134 Neb. 159, 278 N.W. 148 (1938).
62 Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Gudmundson, 145 Neb. 324, 16 N.W. 2d 474 (1944).
63 State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Hyde, 138 Neb. 541, 293 N.W. 408
(1940).
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so fundamental a question as the integrity of its officers to be com-
promised by a private settlement.64
The courts stress that an attorney's relationship with a client
is primarily one of trust and confidence, upon which the latter re-
lies for the protection of his legal rights in the cause for which the
attorney is retained; the fundamental responsibility of the lawyer,
therefore, is to exercise the utmost good faith in all of his dealings
with the client.65 Private interests of counsel are not to be per-
mitted to compete or conflict with those of the client.66 Where an
attorney and a client have an interest in the same transaction, the
courts will demand clear and conclusive proof that no advantage
was taken of the client, and that the entire interest of the attorney
was clearly explained to the client; otherwise, the very juxtapo-
sition of interests will incline the courts to find a breach of pro-
fessional obligation.67
Conversely, the courts are zealous to protect the interests of
their officers and to see that they receive compensation and such
other considerations as they may be entitled to claim.68 A reason-
able fee for services performed is recognized in all instances where
the lawyer has not contracted to perform for an inadequate
amount.69 The reasonableness of the fee is to be determined by the
nature of the case, the amount involved, the results obtained through
the attorney's efforts, the length of time devoted to the cause, and
the like.70 A contingent fee, if expressly agreed to between counsel
and client, and specifically set forth in the agreement, will be up-
held.71
A summary of the general legal basis for the courts' assertion
of the right to police the profession was eloquently delivered by
04 Spillman v. Priest, 123 Neb. 241, 242 N.W. 433 (1932).
65 Colick v. Colick, 148 Neb. 201, 26 N.W.2d 820 (1947); Diedrichs v. Steph-
enson, 101 Neb. 366, 163 N.W. 153 (1917).
06 James v. McNair, 164 Neb. 1, 81 N.W.2d 813 (1957); and cf. Young v.
Card, 145 Neb. 857, 18 N.W.2d 302 (1945).
67 Cf. Hamilton v. Allen, 86 Neb. 401, 125 N.W. 610 (1910).
68 See discussion of this matter in Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 136 Neb.
338, 345-351, 286 N.W. 254 (1939).
69Neb. State Bar Assn. v. Dunker, 160 Neb. 779, 71 N.W.2d 502 (1955);
Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 128 Neb. 141, 258 N.W. 66 (1934).
7 0 Hemmer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 470, 276 N.W. 153 (1937);
Strasser v. Strasser, 153 Neb. 288, 44 N.W. 2d 508 (1950).
71 Miles v. Cheyenne County, 96 Neb. 703, 148 N.W. 959 (1914); Martin v.
Reavis, 117 Neb. 219, 220 N.W. 238 (1928).
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Mr. Justice Day of the Nebraska Supreme Court in a 1937 case, in
which he observed:
When one seeks and attains admission to the bar of the courts
of this state, he voluntarily assumes the obligations imposed by
the ethical regulations generally recognized by the profession, and
the violation of such rules renders an attorney subject to disbar-
ment or suspension ...
But the basis of these decisions is the public policy of the state,
and the public interest .... It is not in the public interest that a
lawyer stir up litigation and strife among people in order to secure
professional employment. Experience has demonstrated that there
is a temptation, under such circumstances, to instigate litigation
where no sufficient cause exists .... 72
As a result of this century and a quarter of attempts at professional
improvement through the devising of ethical codes, statutory re-
forms and increasingly authoritative assertions of judicial power
to punish transgressors, it may be said that the bar is at least more
acutely conscious of its need to conform to some fundamental prin-
ciples of behavior than at any time in its ancient history. It may
also be said that the net result of the movement toward an enforce-
able code of ethics has been to divide the problems into two broad
categories-those arising from the occasional "open and notorious"
flouting of the standards, which call forth the punitive force of
the judiciary; and those involving the question of the application of
the general principle to specific practical situations.
The latter have been the fundamental reason for the develop-
ment of the advisory opinions formulated by the national profes-
sional body as well as by various state and certain municipal associ-
ations. Indeed, because most practitioners are zealous to govern
their behavior by the codes while the disbarred and suspended at-
torney is the proportionately rare exception, it would seem to follow
that these numerous 73 interpretative memoranda - the advisory
opinions of state, national and local professional bodies-are now
72 Hunter v. Crocker, 132 Neb. 214, 216-217, 271 N.W. 444 (1937).
73 A total of 291 published opinions of the A.B.A. committee was compiled
and published in the 1957 volume entitled, Opinions of the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances. To this was added a digest of 383
decisions, not embodied in formal opinions, taken from the minutes of
the committee, id. at 627-648. There were 810 opinions from the files of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and 445 opinions of
The New York County Lawyers' Association, included in a 1956 compila-
tion of Opinions of the Committees on Professional Ethics of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York County
Lawyers Association. The Michigan State Bar Association had published
165 opinions by early 1957; for most of these, cf. 29 Mich. State Bar Journ.
5 (1950); 36 Mich. State Bar Journ. 21 (1957).
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becoming, even more than the statutes and the cases on the sub-
ject, the most authoritative guides to ethical procedures.1 4 Accord-
ingly, they provide the main portion of the present study which
has attempted to sketch the basic features of professional conduct
in the Nebraska bar today.
C. SELECTED ADVISORY OPINIONS
In the second opinion it was called upon to formulate, the Amer-
ican Bar Association committee was asked whether, as a matter of
policy, state or local associations should undertake to investigate
alleged instances of professional misconduct in the absence of a
formal complaint. The committee seized upon this inquiry to stress
the important opportunity thus presented to complement the statu-
tory and adjudicatory efforts at enforcing ethical practices:
One of the chief purposes of bar associations is to exert organ-
ized effort to lessen abuses in the practice and administration of
the law. When members of the Bar commit definite misdeeds af-
fecting strong clients, such clients usually present formal com-
plaints to the proper authorities. But sometimes there are credible
reports or rumors of professional misconduct by members of the
Bar against whom no formal complaint is made to the authorities
... and as bar association action can rarely give relief to clients who
may be wronged, clients often lack the public spirit to make a for-
mal complaint and to assume the burden of substantiating its def-
inite averments. Likewise individual lawyers hesitate to make the
complaint unless they have personal knowledge of the misconduct,
and are themselves at least as prominent in the profession as the
lawyers involved. For these reasons serious misconduct would go
uninvestigated if no committees of the organized Bar assume the
burden.
Again not infrequently the press calls attention to supposed
cases of misconduct by lawyers without making any definite
charges, and if the facts go uninvestigated the local Bar as a whole
is blamed for inactivity.
For the benefit of the profession, therefore, as well as the pub-
lic good, it would seem desirable that some committee of the local
bar association have authority on its own judgment and initiative
to go into such charges without requiring any specific complaint to
be filed.75
,4 The best general study of the subject is Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953). Mr.
Drinker was at that time, and still is, chairman of the A.B.A. committee.
His book, as well as the volume of New York advisory opinions cited in
the foregoing note, was published under the auspices of the William Nel-
son Cromwell Foundation, which has among its stated objectives the
preparation and dissemination of published studies on the subject .of
professional ethics.
75 A.B.A. Op. 2 (July 7, 1924).
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Although this opinion addressed itself to the responsibility of
the bar association committees in matters of complaints, it was
symptomatic of the dynamic role in the general surveillance and
education of the profession which the national committee conceived
to be the purpose of its authority both as to complaints and ad-
visory opinions. It had ample precedent for this, in the activity
which the New York association had been carrying on since 1912,70
and which other states had already begun to follow.7 7 Since those
dates, the body of these opinions has grown to a sufficient number
and variety to provide a commentary on all of the principal propo-
sitions set forth in the canons.
1. Relations Between Attorney and Court7 s
In all his conduct before the court, the lawyer is enjoined
to act as an officer aiding the judge in the proper administration of
justice. It has been contended by the national committee that this
makes it incumbent upon the attorney to advise the court of any
decisions adverse to his position, when it is apparent that opposing
counsel is unaware of them and when it is equally apparent that
the court should properly consider these decisions in judging
76 7 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 46 (1914).
77 29 Neb. State Bar Assn. Proc. 244 (1938).
78 See the classification of the canons in the opening part of this paper,
pp. 705-707, supra. The sources of the advisory opinions cited in the follow-
ing notes are varied; for the American Bar Association and the two New
York associations, as well as for the Michigan State Bar Association, the
sources have been indicated in note 73 supra. Those for New Jersey are
taken from the Yearbooks of the New Jersey State Bar Association, 1946-
49 (since that date the state supreme court has taken over the interpreta-
tion of the canons of ethics). The Missouri Bar Administration Advisory
Opinions, Nos. 1-87, have been compiled in a pamphlet by the state ad-
visory committee; their usefulness for the comparative analyst is some-
what reduced by the absence of dates. The Oregon opinions appear in a
pamphlet published by the bar of that state, which contains the state bar
act, rules of procedure in the state courts with reference to discipline, and
the codes of ethics in addition to opinions through 1950, which are kept
up to date by subsequent publications in the Oregon State Bar Bulletin.
The Legal Ethics Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association has pub-
lished its opinions since 1950 in the weekly journal of the association.
The Illinois State Bar Association opinions are mimeographed, and were
sent to this writer through the courtesy of the state committee.
In the interest of brevity, the opinions cited in the following notes
will not refer to these sources except in instances of direct quotation from
certain state opinions. The sources will be found by reference to notes 73
and 78. With reference to Nebraska advisory opinion, see note 169 infra.
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the case at hand.7 9 It is also held to be the lawyer's responsibility
to avoid any personal dealings with a judge, particularly one before
whom he regularly appears, which would have any appearance of
undue influence.s0 There is a generally recognized "reciprocal re-
lationship of Bench and Bar . . . with reference to the matter of
ex parte communications. No argument, either oral or written,
which is intended or calculated to influence the Court, may ethically
be made by a lawyer to a Judge in the absence of opposing coun-
sel."8
1
These general principles of impartial behavior toward the
court, set forth particularly in Canons 1 and 3, are subject to certain
practical qualifications with respect to Canon 2 on the duty inherent
in the profession of seeing that only the best qualified candidates
are selected for the bench. But in cases of political-although gen-
erally non-partisan-election of judges, it has been pointed out that
a candidate should not make unjust criticisms of incumbent judges
or promise if elected to render decisions favorable to any particu-
lar group.82 An incumbent's use of his title or the prestige of his
position as an electioneering device is generally condemned.83 In-
dividual lawyers may contribute financially to the campaign of a
candidate when the candidate merits support and the circumstances
warrant outside monetary aid.8 4
The question of the protection of rights of indigent persons,
particularly in criminal cases, has come up in smaller communities
where there were not enough attorneys to make possible the com-
plete separation of prosecution, judge and defense. Accordingly,
the American Bar Association in a 1931 opinion ruled that a police
judge or the juvenile judge in a rural community might properly
defend indigent prisoners in higher courts of general jurisdiction,
and added that the city attorney could with equal propriety defend
indigents other than those whom he was compelled by law to prose-
cute.15
In the treatment of criminal defendants, particularly by the
79A.B.A. Op. 280 (June 18, 1949); cf. also A.B.A. Op. 146 (July 17, 1935);
N.Y. Bar Op. 643 (Nov. 10, 1943).
80 A.B.A. Op. 89 (Dec. 3, 1932).
81 Mich. Op. 96 (Aug. 1946).
82 Mich. Op. 74 (March 1941).
83 Id.; and cf. A.B.A. Op. 189 (Nov. 11, 1938).
84 A.B.A. Op. 226 (July 12, 1941); but see the argument in N.Y. Co. Law.
Op. 304 (1933), loc. cit. note 73 supra.
85 A.B.A. Op. 55 (Dec. 14, 1931).
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state's attorney, the canons have stressed the duty imposed by
standards of fair play. It has been emphasized that a prosecutor
may not properly induce a prisoner to withdraw a plea of not
guilty under the threat of charging him with a more serious offense
if he refuses.80 Nor should counsel for the defense undertake to
advise his client as to what he should do in the event that he flees
from custody,8 7 or to withhold from the court information as to the
whereabouts of a client who has escaped.s s Once a lawyer has ac-
cepted the retainer in the case of a criminal defendant, however,
he is:
... authorized and required: to interpose in behalf of his client every
available constitutional and statutory safeguard of the rights of the
accused; to object to the presentation by the prosecution of any
evidence against the accused unless such evidence is legally admis-
sible; to urge every available objection to the indictment or pre-
sentment, to the jurisdiction of the trial tribunal and to the legal
sufficiency of the proof presented; to present in behalf of the
accused any testimony, believed by him to be trustworthy and
relevant, which tends to meet the charge against the accused
(whether by reason of the bad character of the prosecution's wit-
ness(es] or their unreliability or bias, or by reason of any other
defect) which create a reasonable doubt of guilt either of any of-
fense or of the particular degree of the offense with which the
accused is charged.8 9
2. Relations Between Attorney and Client
The conflict of interests which may arise in many ways from
the fundamental duties imposed upon the lawyer when he is con-
fronted with the particular needs of his client, has occasioned some
advisory comment from virtually every bar association which has
published its opinions. The private practitioner elected to public
office with unfinished private business remaining, the family law-
yer who is asked by both husband and wife to undertake divorce
proceedings, the attorney who is asked by a client to prosecute a
claim against a company in which the attorney has an investment,
are common illustrations of the issues that blossom in this area.
It is hardly to be disputed that an attorney may not ethically
accept retainers from both sides in a controversy 0° Under certain
circumstances where all parties concerned have been made fully
86Mich. Op. 129 (Oct. 1949).
87A.B.A. Op. 150 (Feb. 15, 1936).
88 A.B.A. Op. 155 (May 4, 1936); and cf. A.B.A. Op. 156 (May 4, 1936).
89 N.Y. Op. 201 (Oct. 30, 1931), loc. cit. 98.
90 Ore. Op. 2 (Aug. 15, 1936); cf. A.B.A. Op. 40 (Sept. 15, 1931); A.B.A. Op.
49 (Dec. 12, 1931); A.B.A. Op. 64 (March 19, 1932).
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aware of the possible conflict of interests, and upon consent of the
parties so informed, a lawyer may properly represent both inter;
ests,91 but the committees of both state and national associations
are disposed to view such situations with disapproval or at least
without enthusiasm. Lawyers in any official capacity-members
of a state or municipal assembly, or a city or state's attorney92 -
are under considerable burden to justify any service they perform
for a private client. The suit against a former client is a standard
illustration of the dilemma presented by the injunction against
conflicting interests, and the advisory opinions on this problem are
generally disposed toward a strict construction.9 3
How such conflicts can arise out of the most routine experi-
ences of a practitioner is shown in a case involving an Oregon at-
torney to whom a Nebraska law firm forwarded a claim based
upon an accident in a Portland department store. The Oregon law-
yer made an investigation as requested, after having prepared an
opinion concerning the liability of the store, and found that the
business was operated by a partnership and that one of the partners
was a regular client of his. The Oregon attorney notified the Ne-
braskans of his discovery, and the latter notified him that he would
be expected to treat such information as he had received from
the plaintiff's counsel "in an ethical manner." Subsequently, an
action was filed in Oregon against the store, joining therein the
partner who was the regular client of the Oregon attorney involved.
The board of governors of the Oregon State Bar agreed that the
attorney should not, under these circumstances, defend the action
or divulge the information he had received from the forwarding
attorneys.
94
The client who leaves one lawyer and seeks to engage the
services of another-like the patient who is continually switching
physicians-presents the problem anticipated by, Canon 7. Any
lawyer has a right to discuss pending legal matters, in which he
has not been adversely committed, with another attorney's client
if he is sought out by the client; if thereafter he is retained as an
associate counsel, it is considered to be his duty to notify the orig-
inal lawyer thereof, and to refrain from handling the pending
91 A.B.A. Op. 243 (June 20, 1942).
92 Cf. Ore. Op. 10 (March 20, 1939), where conflict arose from attorney's of-
fice in the state legislature; Ore. Op. 24 (Feb. 23, 1946), where attorney
was a member of a city council.
93 Cf. Ore. Op. 21 (June 10, 1944); Mo. Op. 21 (undated); Mich. Op. 45
(April 1939); and see the numerous references in the New York opinions,
loc. cit. note 73 supra, index under "actions against former clients."
94 Ore. Op. 26 (Sept. 4, 1946).
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cause until recognized by the first lawyer or advised that the first
lawyer has withdrawn. 5 To solicit the business of another attorney,
of course, is the crux of the unethical. 6
Once counsel has accepted a retainer, the permissible lengths
to which he may go in supporting the client's case have elicited some
advisory comment. The New Jersey State Bar Association has con-
demned the efforts of an attorney to obtain a Mexican divorce by
"proxy" for a client when such proceedings were illegal under New
Jersey statutes.0 7 Permitting clients to send collection letters on
the attorney's stationery is condemned, 98 as is a practice of obtaining
and holding property of an adverse party until the client can obtain
some concession from the adversary as a condition of the return of
the property.99
Correlative with this injunction of ethics is the duty of counsel
to restrain clients who undertake improper actions on their own
initiative. Once a case is in litigation, the attorney may not condone
or aid his client's efforts to reach a settlement with the adverse party
without the knowledge of the adverse counsel.10 0 Nor is it con-
sidered desirable for a lawyer engaged as the counsel in the trial
of a cause to serve as a witness for his client.10 1
The major point of honor in attorney-client relationships, per-
haps, is the matter of preserving the confidences of the client.
It is almost unanimously held that the duty to preserve such vital
and intimate information outlives the employment of the lawyer
by the party communicating the confidential matter.10 2 The duty
is also found to extend to the secretarial personnel and other agents
of the law firm when they have occasion to handle such informa-
tion.10 3 Once a lawyer has represented one party with respect to
a particular claim, it is improper for him to represent the adverse
party even though all of the facts involved are of public record.1'4
9 5 Mich. Op. 113 (May 1948); cf. Ill. Op. 127 (undated); A.B.A. Op. 10 (July
13, 1926); A.B.A. Op. 149 (Feb. 15, 1936); A.B.A. Op. 209 (Nov. 23, 1940).
96 Cf. N.J. Op. of Sept. 11, 1947.
97 N.J. Op. of Dec. 1946; cf. A.B.A. Op. 82 (Aug. 27, 1932); A.B.A. Op. 248
(Dec. 19, 1942).
98 AB.A. Op. 253 (June 26, 1943).
99 E.g., Mich. Op. 93 (Nov. 1945).
100 A.B.A. Op. 75 (Aug. 27, 1932).
101 Ore. Op. 48 (June 28, 1957).
102 Cf. Mo. Op. 52 (undated); but see Mich. Op. 7 (Oct. 1936).
103 Ill. Op. 165 (Aug. 15, 1957).
104 Mich. Op. 45 (April 1939).
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But where it is discovered that fraud or imposition has been prac-
ticed upon an adverse party, it becomes the lawyer's duty to in-
form all interested persons.105 A lawyer-client relationship is not
established where a client misrepresents his identity, so as to
prevent the attorney from representing the opposing party and
revealing such information as may be necessary to protect the
legitimate client's interests.10 When there is doubt as to whether
an attorney-client relationship has been effected, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the preservation of any confidences. 0 7
"Reasons of sound public policy underly the injunctions of this
canon," observed the Michigan advisory group in a 1954 opinion:
It is to the fundamental interest of the public, and to the preserva-
tion of the structure and administration of the law itself, that
those needing and seeking the protection of the law should be priv-
ileged to communicate to legal counsel the circumstances of their
affairs, and to receive guidance in the law, with the assurance that
such communications will be held in strictest trust and confidence.
Were the rules othervise-in other words, if lawyers were per-
mitted or required to publicize their client's confidences to public
authorities or others-the administration of the law itself would
inevitably suffer and deteriorate through public fear of the conse-
quences of consultation with legal counsel.'08
3. Relations With Opposing Parties, Witnesses and Counsel
Canon 9 enjoins a lawyer to refrain from communicating in
any way with an adverse party represented by counsel; this has
been interpreted to include the prohibition of sending copies of
letters being delivered to the adverse counsel. 0 9 It also has been
applied to a practice which presents itself in various tempting forms
to many practitioners-preparing an official-looking document in
which the adverse party is warned that he is going to be the object
of a law suit. Such an instrument is condemned because its pri-
mary purpose is to mislead and frighten a layman who receives it,
to persuade him that the attorney actually has the power to compel
him to come to the attorney's office and to agree to a settlement
before the unfamiliar and forbidding machinery of the courts en-
gages him." 0
After a suit has been filed, it is held to be unethical for ad-
105 Mich. Op. 59 (Feb. 1940).
'
0 Mich. Op. 116 (July 1948).
107A.B.A. Op. 216 (March 15, 1941).
108 Mich. Op. 163 (ec. 1945), loc. cit. note 73 supra, 39.
100 Ill. Op. 108 (undated); cf. A.B.A. Op. 108 (March 10, 1934).
110 Ill. Op. 146 (Dec. 31, 1956).
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justers of the insurance company involved to seek out the plain-
tiff's physician, without plaintiff's consent, and attempt to obtain
full information about the injuries suffered by the plaintiff."' And
it is held to be improper for a lawyer to interview the adverse
party regarding the facts in the case without the consent of his
counsel, whether or not the party is to be a witness in the case.1 12
There are, of course, certain qualifications to these general
propositions of behavior. As the Oregon Bar's board of governors
observed in a 1938 opinion, concerning communications direct with
an adverse party represented by counsel, "if there are circumstances
which would justify such communications, we suggest that they are
quite unusual and that an attorney should refrain from such com-
munication unless it appears that adverse counsel has consented
thereto or has himself been guilty of such misconduct as to justify
direct communication."" 3 It is, after all, seldom a hardship upon
plaintiff's attorney to seek proper information from the adverse
party and his witnesses by directing his requests through the ad-
verse counsel. "The ascertainment of the truth is always essential
to the attainment of justice and it is the duty of the attorney to
learn the facts by every fair means within his reach."1 4 As a
Michigan advisory opinion summarized it:
The general duty of counsel for a litigant may include not only
the presentation of his client's claim or defense in open court but
also the investigation of the facts underlying the controversy in
order to properly plead the elements of the claim or defense. Such
investigation may necessitate the interviewing of a witness or pro-
spective witnesses for the opposing litigant, and is expressly per-
mitted by Canon 39. Consent of the opposing counsel or party is
not necessary.115
4. Conduct During Trial
Canon 20 makes clear that an attorney should not discuss any
case which is pending, through a public medium such as a news-
paper. When his client undertakes such discussion, the ethical po-
sition of the lawyer becomes somewhat more difficult to define.
If he knows nothing about his client's action, he is under no duty
to withdraw from the case, but is required to caution the client
"'Mo. Op. 37 (undated); cf. Mich. Op. 69 (Oct. 1940).
112 Mich. Op. 41 (Jan. 1939); cf. A.B.A. Op. 66 (March 19, 1932); A.B.A. Op.
187 (July 24, 1938).
113 Ore. Op. 9 (March 19, 1938), loc. cit. note 73, 99.
114A.B.A. Op. 117 (Aug. 27, 1934); cf. also A.B.A. Op. 14 (Jan. 10, 1929);
A.B.A. Op. 127 (March 15, 1935).
115 Mich. Op. 117 (July 1948), loc. cit. note 73 supra, 148; cf. Ill. Op. 163
(July 12, 1957).
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against such practices; if the client persists, a withdrawal may
then become justifiable."6
That this canon does not prohibit the issuance of statements
concerning pending cases by public officials, provided these do not
contain statements of fact likely to be prejudicial to the defendants,
was the conclusion of the A.B.A. committee in a 1940 opinion. The
opinion was prompted by the announcement in 1938 by the Attor-
ney-General of the United States that the Department of Justice
would thereafter issue public statements from time to time by way
of clarifying public policy with respect to the prosecution of cer-
tain laws-specifically, the anti-trust laws. While indicating that
it was not persuaded that the examples of these statements to that
date had been free from potentially adverse effects upon the de-
fendants' causes, the A.B.A. committee conceded that the Attorney-
General as executive head of the Department of Justice was a
public official with a duty of making a public report which was
materially different from a statement issued by an attorney in a
private suit."7
Fair dealing-the "very punctilio of honor," as Mr. Justice
Cardozo once put it-is the essence of a truly professional rela-
tionship between opposing attorneys and the court during the trial
of a case. Any information or any action which affects an adverse
counsel is to be called promptly to his attention."8 It is generally
maintained that a lawyer may not, after a verdict has been given
in by a jury, interview members of the jury as to what led to their
conclusion." 9 And once an attorney has agreed to a preservation
of the status quo in a case, it is expected that he will not, without
notice to the court and to opposing counsel, be a party to the filing
of another suit on the same matter. 20
5. Fiduciary Principles
The general considerations of honorable conduct and good faith
which permeate the canons defining the relationships between the
several parties to litigation, in the case of trust property have re-
quired some special interpretations. Because in the natural course
of events the attorney commonly comes into corporeal possession
of his client's property, particularly in cases of settlement of claims
by or against the client, legislatures and courts as well as advisory
116 Cf. Ill. Op. 116 (undated).
"1A.B.A. Op. 199 (Jan. 26, 1940).
1 18 Cf. A.B.A. Op. 47 (Sept. 18, 1931); A.B.A. Op. 124 (Dec. 14, 1934).
119 A.B.A. Op. 109 (March 10, 1934).
120 A.B.A. Op. 25 (May 5, 1930).
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committees have concerned themselves with the particular safe-
guarding of the interests involved. 12 1 It is recognized that the prop-
erty concerned in litigation may be the most likely security for the
lawyer's fee, and a conveyance of the _property for this purpose is
permitted if it is made subject to any rights of the adverse party.' -
But where, on the other hand, it is the lawyer who is indebted to
the client, he may not ethically prepare a will for the client which,
in the process of disposing of the estate, provides for the discharge
of the attorney's indebtedness. 123
The fiduciary principle extends to Canon 38 relating to the
lawyer's responsibility for making known to his client any and all
remuneration he is receiving from other sources in connection with
the client's case. A typical instance involves the retaining of an
attorney by a mortgagor, where the attorney is expected to make
search of the records, draw the bond and mortgage, and close the
loan. The attorney receives part of the fees noted on the state and
federal searches; he may also receive a commission from the mort-
gagee in placing the mortgage loan. The New Jersey State Bar
Association held that he was required to make full disclosure of
the fees and commissions to his client, even though the fees were
statutory. 24
In the case of rebates from legal advertising, the Michigan ad-
visory committee has ruled that (1) the attorney may not retain
the rebate unless his client gives consent, and that (2) he-may not
retain it even then unless he credits the full amount to the client's
account. 12 5 In divorce cases, where the wife's attorney receives
all or part of his fee from the husband, it has been suggested that
he may retain the fee if the wife consents and if there is no collu-
sion in respect of the procurement of the divorce.126 Generally
speaking, in all cases a lawyer should refrain from charging a client
for any item of expense not actually disbursed. 127
6. Fees and Expenses
Closely related to the handling of the client's funds is the mat-
ter of fixing a proper charge upon the client for professional serv-
121 Cf. notes 43-45, 62-65, supra.
122 A.B.A. Op. 29 (Aug. 19, 1930).
123 Mich. Op. 112 (Dec. 1948).
124 N.J. Op. of Sept. 11, 1947; and cf. Mich. Op. 126 (Oct. 1949); A.B.A. Op.
196 (Oct. 20, 1939).
125 Mich. Op. 64 (March 1940).
126 Mich. Op. 123 (April 1949).
127A.B.A. Op. 38 (May 4, 1931).
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ices. The amount of the fee should be a matter of agreement be-
tween client and practitioner, and under ordinary circumstances
no question of ethics is presented unless the fee demanded in a
given case is flagrantly excessive.128 A dispute commonly arises,
however, where the fee was fixed in contemplation of a certain
amount of professional service required for the client-for ex-
ample, in the preparation of a defense to a complaint. Thereafter
it is decided to prepare a counterclaim; or, in the case of the plain-
tiff's lawyer, the defense to a counterclaim may not have been
anticipated. This may properly be made the subject of an addi-
tional fee.1
29
Minimum fees set by local bar associations are to be inter-
preted as advisory only, since there is a strong likelihood that an
agreement among all of the attorneys in a given community to
observe such minima would subject them to a charge of violation
of the anti-trust laws. 130 Nor can lawyers enter competitive bid-
ding with other professionals in attempting to provide the lowest
fee for legal work being commissioned by a municipal corpora-
tion.131 An agreement with a credit association to charge a pre-
determined fee to all association customers who are referred to
the attorney is also held to be improper.132
Contingent fees have presented a difficult ethical question to
the codes, and the A.B.A. canon qualifies its endorsement by stipu-
lating that they must bear the sanction of local law. Beyond this,
it is stipulated further that the client in any case must bear the
responsibility for reasonable expenses which may have been ad-
vanced by the lawyer.133 A lawyer may not execute a percentage
agreement with the wife in a divorce case for a part of the property
settlement involved. 34
An attorney may with propriety, as a matter of convenience,
advance expenses of litigation for persons who are already actual
bona fide clients, but in such case only subject to reimbursement
regardless of the outcome of the litigation. An advance to abide the
outcome of the case, and without obligation of reimbursement, by
the client unless the litigation terminates successfully, means simply
12B A.B.A. Op. 27 (May 5, 1930).
129 Mo. Op. 64 (undated).
130 Ill. Op. 106 (undated).
131 Mich. Op. 133 (Jan. 1950).
132 Mich. Op. 153 (Oct. 1953); and cf. A.B.A. Op. 56 (Dec. 14, 1931).
133A.B.A. Op. 246 (June 20, 1942); Mo. Op. 20 (undated); and cf. Ill. Op.
137 (Sept. 17, 1955), and Mich. Op. 66 (May 1940).
134Mich. Op. 72 (Dec. 1940).
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paying or bearing the expenses of the litigation and constitutes
-.. unethical conduct."35
The advancement of money to a client, as the foregoing quotation
indicates, is akin to the contingent fee in that it is ringed with
caveats. Court costs, money f-or the expense of bringing in wit-
nesses, and expenses legitimately related to the prosecution of the
case are considered permissible. "31 But the advancement of money
to pay fines, to cover the cost of medical examination of a client
under a contingent fee arrangement, and to cover living expenses
are usually condemned; "advancements of living expenses ... are
most important tools used in the solicitation of cases," an Illinois
opinion points out. This encourages lawyers to bid against each
other, and also tends to involve them too deeply in an investment
in a personal injury case. 37
7. Conduct of the Business of Law Practice
By far the most prolific source of commentary on professional
ethics has been the canon on advertising; and at the same time it
has called forth the most divergence of views among state and local
bar committees. As to the number of opinions, the A.B.A. has pub-
lished 97 such pronouncements to date, the New York associations
well over a hundred, Michigan 67, Illinois 24, Oregon 17 and Mis-
souri 16. Obviously, with such a quantity of material, a separate
study on this single phase of ethics may ultimately be necessary;
within the limits of the present paper, the main propositions-and
conflicts of view-can only be generally outlined. 38 It is signifi-
cant that this canon has been amended five times since its adoption
-more than any other; it is also interesting to note that the first
opinion delivered by the A.B.A. committee in 1924, and two of the
first three given by the New York County Lawyers' Association in
1912, dealt with this canon. The view expressed by the national
agency, it is fair to say, represents an attitude to which the bar in
general has subscribed ever since; the question, however, has had
what appear to be interminable possibilities of variation which
have demanded continual new considerations. In any event, the
A.B.A. said:
The essential dignity of the profession requires that the solicita-
tion of professional employment should be avoided. Canon 27 of the
Canons of Ethics disapproves all forms of solicitation as unprofes-
sional and specifically states that "solicitation of business by circu-
'35 Ore. Op. 6 (Feb. 20, 1937).
136 Cf. Mo. Op. 27 (undated).
137 Ill. Op. 151 (Feb. 6, 1956).
138 Cf. Table II in the Appendix.
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lars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews,
not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." The Canon
makes no exception as to solicitation from other members of the pro-
fession, and contains no warrant for regarding such solicitation as
differing from or being less improper than similar solicitation
addressed to laymen .... 139
Local custom cannot justify any practice smacking of adver-
tising or solicitation.140 For a number of years the canon gave re-
luctant consent to the common practice in smaller communities
of publishing "card" advertisements in the local newspaper; in
1937, however, this publication was outlawed and cards were lim-
ited to approved law lists.14 The law lists themselves were sub-
sequently hedged with precautions in a separate canon (43), and
the attorney's general relations with the newspaper were likewise
made the subject of a special statement (Canon 40).
Although, in view of the several and somewhat ambivalent
amendments which have affected Canon 27 over the years, there
is an understandable lack of complete consistency in A.B.A. ad-
visory opinions addressed to the differing provisions of the canon,
it is in the state pronouncements that the sharpest degree of con-
flict has developed-between the states and with the national as-
sociation. Local custom, many local committees ardently argue,
should certainly operate to keep such a general ethical principle
in touch with realities. In the final analysis, the variety of opinions
demanded by the advertising canon is obviously due to the per-
sistence and recurrence of particular local procedures which refuse
to be forced into a uniform mold. Table II undertakes to portray
these variations of interpretation in the matter of professional pub-
licity.
The growth of the partnership and the law firm by 1928 ac-
counts, in all probability, for the fact that Canon 33 headed the list
of thirteen new canons added to the code in that year. The partner-
ship presented a variety of problems of conduct, including the mat-
ter of sharing business with laymen (e.g., accountants) which was
substantially the subject of Canon 34. "A member of the Bar who
has ceased practicing law is like any other layman and may enter
any business or business association permitted laymen," observed
the Missouri committee. "However, if the member of the Bar ...
is continuing to practice law, then such an association or the refer-
139 A.B.A. Op. 1 (Jan. 15, 1924); cf. N. Y. Co. Op. 1 (Jan. 1912); N. Y. Co. Op.
3 (Feb. 1912) It is possible that Canon 46 has qualified the statement
as to "solicitation" through other attorneys.
140 A.B.A. Op. 4 (July 7, 1924).
141 Cf. A.B.A. Op. 275 (Sept. 20, 1947).
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ence of business therefrom is improper."'1 2 In particular the ad-
vertising of specialized services (e.g., income tax consultation) by
a layman associated with a lawyer would be improper, even if the
lawyer's name were not mentioned.14 3 Where such an association
between a practitioner and a lay specialist is permitted, the lawyer
must cease to hold himself out as such and confine himself to the
activities open to lay accountants.4 4
Carrying the name of a deceased partner in a firm name has
been a practice subjected to a number of restrictive advisories.
It is conceded to be proper if the fact of death is appropriately noted,
and if the carrying of the name is discontinued within a reasonable
time.145 A former partner who has left the firm is not to be listed
where the function of the firm name is to identify present members
of the firm.14 6 Nor should a partner elected to a judgeship or other
public office permit his name to be continued on the firm's list.1'4 7
The primary objection to a partnership with laymen is the
facility with which the association lends itself to solicitation of pro-
fessional services of the lawyer. Early in the history of Canon 34,
it was announced in various states that this undesirable effect was
not avoided, but rather enhanced, by the maintenance of so-called
branch offices by the attorney, where the branch office was main-
tained with a realtor or other lay businessman.' 48 It is generally
considered that the employment of lay collectors by a lawyer is
unethical. 14 9 The division of fees with any such laymen is dis-
approved; as for dividing fees with other lawyers, such as a for-
warding lawyer, it is generally considered to be proper in such
cases and to the extent that the forwarding attorney has rendered
certain services to the client, but not where his sole function has
been to pass the material along to another practitioner and where
his client expects nothing more from him.150
The increasing practice of employing attorneys by trade as-
sociations and by corporations led to the canon on intermediaries
and a succession of advisory opinions on that subject. A feature par-
142 Loc. cit. note 129 supra.
143 A.B.A. Op. 234 (Feb. 12, 1942).
144 A.B.A. Op. 269 (June 12, 1945); and cf. Mich. Op. 24 (Aug. 1937).
1'5 Cf. Ore. Op. 15 (May 20, 1939); Okla. Op. 11 (Dec. 30, 1950).
146 A.B.A. Op. 97 (May 3, 1933).
147A.B.A. Op. 143 (May 9, 1935).
148 Mich. Op. 26 (Sept. 1937).
149 Cf. Mo. Op. 14 (undated).
1,0 Ill. Op. 118 (undated); cf. A.B.A. Op. 153 (Feb. 15, 1936).
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ticularly condemned is the persistent effort of many associations
and occasional corporations to arrange for the hired lawyer to
render services for individual members.'5 ' A related practice which
comes under professional disapproval is the preparation of pamph-
lets or newsletters on legal subjects to be distributed to all mem-
bers within the group, if the publication includes the name of the
attorney and his firm, and particularly if it is known or stated that
he is retained as general counsel for the group. 5 2 The A.B.A. pre-
fers that such bulletins make explicit that they are for general in-
formation and not for the guidance of any individual member.1
53
The continuing professional rule against any utterance which
may make conspicuous the availability of a particular attorney's
services has extended to the regulations with reference to legal
specialists in Canon 45, notices to other attorneys (46) and the
aiding of unauthorized practice of law (47). Although for historical
reasons the specialists of admiralty and of patent, trademark and
copyright practice have been treated as exceptions and have been
allowed to be listed on letterheads and in general classified direc-
tories,1 5 4 the trend is against any relaxing of the prohibitions in
general. "The use of the words 'Lawyer' or 'Attorney' . . . has al-
ways been considered sufficiently informative," declared a Michigan
opinion in ruling that the holder of both LL. B. and M. D. degrees
could not use a combination letterhead indicating a practice in both
areas with a specialty in medical jurisprudence. 55 Such a specialty
can only be made known to local attorneys if the service is ren-
dered exclusively to other lawyers. 156 Practice before an admin-
istrative agency has been held not to be a specialty to be noticed
to other practitioners. 57
Unauthorized practice of law is recognized as being a subject
in general within the province of the courts in each locality; 58
but numerous advisory opinions, extending to this subject from
the area embraced by Canon 35, have been given on the auxiliary
'5'Mich. Op. 42 (Jan. 1939); Mo. Op. 5 (undated); Ill. Op. 136 (undated).
152 E.g., Neb. Op. of Dec. 13, 1955; Mich. Op. 57 (Feb. 1940).
153A.B.A. Op. 273 (Oct. 25, 1946).
154 Cf. Mo. Op. 81 (undated); A.B.A. Op. 203 (Nov. 23, 1940).
'55Mich. Op. 28 (Dec. 1937).
156 A.B.A. Op. 184 (July 23, 1938).
157A.B.A. Op. 198 (July 12, 1941).
1'8A.B.A. Op. 198 (Oct. 21, 1939).
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considerations arising from an attorneys' employment by a cor-
poration or association. The basic rule to be derived from reading
Canons 35 and 47 together appears to be that an attorney may
properly perform legal services for a lay agency such as a cor-
poration or group, where these are services required by the agency
as a client in its own capacity. Where the effect of the counsel's
service to the agency is to permit it to provide legal assistance to
members or customers in terms of their individual legal problems,
it amounts to unauthorized practice.159
It has been said that the essence of a profession is a specialized
body of knowledge, a basic minimum requirement for admission
to the group, and a self-enforcing discipline of the membership.
In the body of canons represented under this heading, the legal
profession through its code has given as much practical force as
possible to the third of these essentials.
8. General Professional Responsibilities
Throughout the canons runs the theme of high professional
morality, but it is punctuated for emphasis by nine canons which
address themselves specifically to the function of morals in prac-
tice. Purchasing an interest in a suit, and stirring up litigation, are
two particular prohibitions. The purchase of choses in action,160
or the acceptance of stock in a corporation for which services
have been engaged, even where the stock is intended as payment of
the fee,161 are typical of the practices disapproved under these
canons. Nor may an attorney permit a group to solicit persons
to join in an action which the group proposes that he bring in its
behalf, where the solicited persons are asked to sign percentage
contracts employing the lawyer.162
All of these canons, of course, look to the same general ob-
jective as Canon 29, which is entitled, "Upholding the Honor of
the Profession." The latter, however, affords the means of reducing
the proposition to concrete terms. Together with Canons 31 and 41,
it admonishes the practitioner not to abet any client in an act which
19 Cf. the various illustrations in the A.B.A. opinions annotated under these
canons, loc. cit. note 73 supra, as well as the subjects indexed under
these headings in the state and local collections cited in notes 73 and 78
supra.
160 A.B.A. Op. 51 (Dec. 14, 1931); cf. A.B.A. Op. 176 (Feb. 19, 1938); Mich.
Op. 65 (March 1940).
161 A.B.A. Op. 279 (June 18, 1949); A.B.A. Op. 246 (June 20, 1942).
162 Cf. Mich. Op. 101 (March 1947).
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either violates the law or in any way tends to thwart the adminis-
tration of justice-e.g., arranging for mala fide residence in an-
other state to institute divorce proceedings, 163 counseling any group
on means of violating a given law with impunity,0 4 and the like.
The Mexican divorce artifice has already been cited, 165 as has the
abetting of a client's flight or concealment from apprehension in a
criminal action.166
Canons 15 and 16, discussed earlier, admonished the attorney
to keep both his own actions and those of his clients within the
bounds of propriety in the prosecution of the client's case. In Canon
44, the bar has attempted to define the lawyer's position when his
relationship with his client undergoes a drastic change after the
case is well under way. A Nebraska opinion strikingly illustrates
an instance in which such a change does not warrant an attorney's
withdrawal: where the attorney originally undertook a case for
an indigent client and, having won in the trial court, is then con-
fronted with an appeal by the adverse party. The advisory opinion
was that he was obliged to meet the expense of appellee's briefs
and filing costs under the same terms that he had agreed upon for
the trial of the cause. The destitute condition of the client had
been known to counsel from the beginning.
The withdrawal of this attorney would simply mean that some
other attorney would of necessity have to assume the burden which
this attorney now declines to assume if the rights of this litigant
are to be protected. The original contract of employment by this
attorney carried with it the implied agreement on his part to
conduct the litigation through to its conclusion. A withdrawal by
the attorney at this late date and in this stage of the litigation is
... a violation of that implied agreement.107
III. SUMMARY
Any study of ethics in professional practice is of necessity an
unfinished one. The steady output of advisory opinions indicates
103 A.B.A. Op. 84 (Aug. 27, 1932); but see A.B.A. Op. 268 (June 21, 1945).
164 A.B.A. Op. 287 (June 27, 1953).
1 5 Cf. note 97 supra; and see A.B.A. Op. 248 (Dec. 19, 1942).
16 Cf. note 88 supra; Mich. Op. 22 (Sept. 1937).
167 Neb. Oo. of Nov. 23, 1955; on circumstances properly excusing the at-
torney, cf. Okla. Op. 3 (April 12, 1950). The Nebraska committee in-
formally suggested seeking funds from local service organizations or
inquiring into the availability of certain county funds to apply against
the costs of the appeal. See also Mich. Op. 127 (Oct. 1949).
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that new situations are continually arising to present different
questions of practical application. There is also the fact that any
esoteric expression of ideals must be treated with a certain degree
of sophistication-i. e., the actual cases of disbarment and suspen-
sion represent the fractional minority who deliberately flout the
rules of professional conduct; the advisory opinions reflect the de-
sire of another body of practitioners to do right by their calling-
but they also doubtless represent a distinct minority. In between
lies the great majority of members of the bar-doubtless subscribing
in principle to the canons and the interpretations set out in the
advisory opinions, but inarticulate in the matter and rather dis-
posed, in proportion to their degree of practical experience in the
law, to use their own judgment as to the course of action to choose
in disposing of a particular piece of business.
It is in the functioning of this majority that the most important
chapter in the case history of ethics in practice will eventually be
found. In other words, in the complaints and grievances actually
certified to the various district committees of the Nebraska bar,
or their counterparts in other jurisdictions, the law in action as
regards professional ethics can be studied. This material was not
available at the time this article went to press; it is hoped that an
analysis of this material can be made and incorporated in a future
article at an early date-for in a study of the day-by-day practices
of working lawyers throughout Nebraska which have prompted
inquiry by the local committees, an identification or description
of the actions specifically complained of, and a checklist of the
dispositions made of these complaints, it will be possible to under-
stand what the ultimate practical impact of the ethical codes
actually has been.16s
The reader of this paper will also note the conspicuous paucity
of Nebraska opinions. This is not to be taken as an indication that
the state advisory committee has not been active in the preparation
of such opinions-quite the contrary.1 9 It simply means that Ne-
braska, like most states, has not seen fit to compile these opinions
168 This material is in the process of being collected. Although data on the
complaints prior to the integration of the bar and the formation of the
district committees is probably no longer accessible, it is worth pointing
out that the committees of inquiry from the period of the first World
War to 1937 annually reported on the disposition of complaints heard
by them throughout the year.
169 Cf. reports of the state committee in the annual proceedings of the state
association, E. g., 37 Nebr. L. Rev. 64 et seq. (1958).
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and make them generally available in published form.17 0 It is hoped
that this situation also may be remedied, and that at an early date
it will be possible to supplement the present study with some single
publication which will make available to the state bar the summary
of Nebraska interpretations of the day-by-day questions of pro-
fessional conduct. In view of the state's pioneering work in the
devising of the codes of ethics, and in the implementation of their
practical functioning through the early committee of inquiry and
the subsequent integration of the state bar, both of these projects
(the compilation of the advisory opinions and the analysis of the
practical disposition of complaints and grievances) would further
enhance the high professional tone which the legal fraternity of
the state has consistently maintained.
TABLE I
Adoption and Amendment of the Canons
of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association
CANONS 1-32
", 33-45
" 46
1) 47
CANON
it
Adoptions
ADOPTED 1908
" 1928
" 1933
" 1937
Amendments
AmENDED 1937
"t 1933, 1937it 1937
31 1933
1937, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1951
1928
1937
1937
1933, 1937, 1942
" 1956
170 Certain of these opinions have begun to be published in the Nebraska
State Bar Journal, following suggestions to that effect at the 1957 state
convention. It is suggested, however, that a single comprehensive
pamphlet of selected opinions of general interest to date would more
immediately serve the interests of the practicing attorney in the state,
while the publication of new opinions in the Journal would have the
effect of keeping this pamphlet continually up to date.
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TABLE II
The Varied Opinons on Professional
Advertising (Canon 27)
Subject A.B.A. Opinions*
ADVERTISING BY BUYING SPACE
- IN NEWSPAPER .................................................................. 41, 43, 69, 107, 191, 260
-IN LOCAL COMMUNITY PROGRAMS, BULLETINS, ETC. 207
-IN SPONSORING LOCAL ATHLETIC TEAMS ...................... *
-IN BAR ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS .............................. 24, 227
SOLICITATION OF BUSINESS
-BY CONTACTING OTHER ATTORNEYS ................................ 1, 36, 152, 232
-BY CONTACTING INDIVIDUALS .......................................... 5, 9, 111, 173
-BY EMPLOYMENT IN LAY FIRV ..................................... 35, 233, 234, 273
-BY SOLICITATION OF LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATION ............ 13, 121, 172
-THROUGH ADJUSTERS AND OTHER LAY SPECIALISTS .... 214, 225
LISTING IN LOCAL DIRECTORIES
-SPECIAL TYPOGRAPHY (BOLD FACE, ETC.) ...................... 53, 241
-STATING SPECIALTIES ...................................................... 159, 183, 251, 284
USE OF ATTORNEY'S NAME
-IN PUBLICATIONS OF EMPLOYING CORPORATION .......... 285
-IN PUBLICATIONS OF GROUP SOLICITING
LAW BUSINESS ............................................................... 31
BRANCH OFFICES IN LAY FIRMS ............................................ *
DISTRIBUTION OF GIFTS TO CLIENTS .................................. 59
PUBLICITY THROUGH NEWS STORIES ...................................... 42, 43, 62, 140, 184
DISTRIBUTION OF CIRCULARS .................................................. 73, 120
RUNNING FOR POLITICAL OFFICE ........................................ 74
*These national opinions should be compared with those listed under the
same headings in the state and local opinions, loc. cit. notes 73 and 78.
